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Beyond mystery: Putting algorithmic
accountability in context
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Abstract
Critical algorithm scholarship has demonstrated the difficulties of attributing accountability for the actions and effects of
algorithmic systems. In this commentary, we argue that we cannot stop at denouncing the lack of accountability for
algorithms and their effects but must engage the broader systems and distributed agencies that algorithmic systems exist
within; including standards, regulations, technologies, and social relations. To this end, we explore accountability in ‘‘the
Generated Detective,’’ an algorithmically generated comic. Taking up the mantle of detectives ourselves, we investigate
accountability in relation to this piece of experimental fiction. We problematize efforts to effect accountability through
transparency by undertaking a simple operation: asking for permission to re-publish a set of the algorithmically selected
and modified words and images which make the frames of the comic. Recounting this process, we demonstrate slippage
between the ‘‘complication’’ of the algorithm and the obscurity of the legal and institutional structures in which it exists.
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Algorithms as mysteries
Pursuing algorithmic accountability often translates to
unravelling technical mysteries. As scholars and pub-
lics, we may be deeply fascinated by and personally
invested in tracing clues and uncovering culprits.
The promises are powerful: when an algorithm’s
authors can be identiﬁed, they can be held accountable
for the eﬀects of their work. In the context of normative
and highly regulated legal systems, our tendency is to
conceive of infractions against public wellbeing or
common decency as punishable—if only we can reveal
the answers to a few key questions.
The word ‘‘algorithm’’ has been used to refer
to diverse sets of procedures, implemented in a variety
of conditions with many potential outcomes. However,
for all of us who cannot imagine algorithms as apoli-
tical, the presence of an algorithmic operation indicates
not rationalization but instead baked-in biases and
unintended consequences (see Donovan et al., 2018).
Whether deﬁned as an idealized process or its
implementation, an algorithm under investigation
becomes a sort of smoking gun or bloody footprint,
a trail not yet gone cold to trace as we search for further
implications and responsible parties. The very presence
of an algorithm, in other words, can be like the begin-
ning of a detective story in medias res.
When we approach algorithmic operations as if they
were mysteries, we treat the clues that they oﬀer as
evidence of something. Often that ‘‘something’’ is a
process of events that relate, eventually, to authorship;
someone or something that can be held accountable for
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any ill eﬀects. If the mystery is solved and that author
revealed, justice can potentially be done. The innocent
can be vindicated, victims given recompense, and the
guilty may even be made accountable somehow—though
perhaps not by way of the sort of moral drawing-room
confrontation that Agatha Christie described.
Whether the ethical concerns that emerge around
algorithms are explicitly epistemic, normative, or a
matter of traceability (as in Mittelstadt et al., 2016),
algorithmic governance is a problem that many under-
stand to be pressing (see the review presented in
Danaher et al., 2017). One response to this problem is
to suggest that algorithmic processes should be made
transparent exposed for supervision (Diakopoulos,
2013; Grimmelmann, 2008; Kraemer et al., 2010),
revealing information that might otherwise require
savvy detective work to uncover. Critics decry obscur-
ity and suggest thoughtful legal and technical methods
for limiting it (Crawford and Schultz, 2014; McKelvey,
2010; Pasquale, 2011, 2015). In this essay, we consider
the pursuit of accountability within larger-scale norma-
tivities and address relationship between accountability
and transparency in process and authorship.
The role of transparency and authorship in estab-
lishing algorithmic accountability is especially impor-
tant to trouble. Transparency is a political technology
that aims to make visible that which remains obscure
(Ballestero, 2012). The very utility of algorithmic pro-
cesses is that they remain black boxed as they travel
further from the site and the moment of their produc-
tion, and, as such, are mysteries. Even when algorithms
have very overt eﬀects, some of their technical details
can be diﬃcult for non-experts to parse (see, for exam-
ple, Reddy, 2016)—indeed there is a point at which that
black box becomes impossible for any human to pene-
trate. This being the case, public conversation about
how exactly an algorithm was developed and used
and who played pivotal roles might make an algorithm
available for critique, focusing attention on particular
events or more ‘‘subtle patterns of problematic beha-
viour’’ (Sandvig et al., 2014: 3). However, as Ananny
and Crawford (2018) argue, even if algorithmic black
boxes are opened up, that visibility may never be suﬃ-
cient to bring about a connection between author, algo-
rithm and consequences that is substantial enough that
someone might be held accountable for an algorithm’s
undesirable eﬀects.
However, it seems that a slippage in our understand-
ing of accountability has sedimented in the popular
imagination of algorithms. That slippage presumes
that because many algorithms are constituted by
obscure technical operations, the process for creating
accountabilities implies remedying obscurity by ﬁnding
out who are the authors as responsible parties. That is
not necessarily the case. Accountability is not a matter
of discovering who or what is the author of a technical
operation or information about how it was intended to
perform, but a question about who or what should be
made to answer for those operations. The question of
accountability is caught up in normativities, shared
upon values embedded in particular norms that legal
and moral orders accept and protect. It cannot be
reduced to authorship. Adopting an approach that
builds uncritically on enlightenment epistemologies
that assume that ‘‘seeing a phenomenon creates oppor-
tunities and obligations to make it accountable and
thus to change it’’ (Ananny and Crawford, 2018: 2,
emphasis theirs) is not suﬃcient.
When we frame algorithmic accountability as a pro-
duct of transparency, particularly transparency with
respect to process and authorship, we are neglecting
the larger-scale normativities in which algorithms are
embedded and on which accountability depends.
Responsibility for the consequences of an algorithm
do not necessarily need to be allocated to its author(s).
Making algorithmic processes and their implications
more transparent is important work. We do not want to
dismiss it. We want to think, however, about what we
expect when we attempt to attribute responsibility by
asking ‘‘who did it?’’; by focusing our eﬀorts on reveal-
ing how an algorithm works and who can take the
blame for its eﬀects. Tracing clues to reveal authorship
and its processes might not be enough for accountabil-
ity. The troublesomely attractive notion that one might
productively ‘‘get down to’’ a truth of an algorithm
(as Seaver, 2013 put it) runs the risk of unhelpfully
reifying algorithms as distinct from other processes or
formations (Neyland, 2016). We suggest that critical
scholarship on algorithms could productively attend to
the distributed conditions that algorithms exist within.
Algorithms should be recognized as existing through
other standards, regulations, and agents—these are the
larger-scale normativities we alluded to above.
In this short commentary, we think about algorithms
as mysteries to engage with conventional assumptions
about how transparency can facilitate accountability
when we learn the identity of the author of an algo-
rithm, just as it might if we learned the identity of a
murderer. We suggest that, although questions about
accountability may be explored through attention to
algorithmic authorship, a meaningful link between
authorship and accountability only exists in the context
of legal normativities. Whatever its promises, maybe all
revealing authorship does is unveil the ways that
authorship has been embedded in broader legal, eco-
nomic, political, material, and/or moral systems. What
we recognize as algorithmic practice and its products
are embedded in conditions that include and exceed
them (as in Reddy, 2018). This might not be a very
satisfying conclusion for a mystery, but it does show
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us how important it is to broaden our understanding of
algorithms to include the normative contexts in which
they exist. We demonstrate this by taking up the mantle
of detectives ourselves and engaging in an algorithm-
appropriate investigation of the authorship of—and
through it, legal accountability for—an algorithmically
generated comic. This comic, a provoking and playful
art object called the Generated Detective, also makes
use of the dramatic arc of a detective story genre to
expose and challenge its conventions. We describe
both the comic and our experience seeking permission
to legally reproduce several of its frames to highlight
the nuances of normative accountability that inform
detective stories and algorithmic analysis alike. As we
narrate the processes in which the Generated Detective
is enmeshed, we ponder the conventions of legal
accountability, including the technical and social
issues that they foreground and those that they obscure.
On generating detectives
The Generated Detective1 was created and released in a
series of 15 short instalments in 2014 under the name
Greg Borenstein. It was part of ‘‘National Novel
Generation Month,’’ or NaNoGenMo, a play on the
annual internet-based ‘‘National Novel Writing
Month’’ that writers organized ﬁrst in the United
States and then internationally since 1999 to spur
their production in the month of November.
The pages of the Generated Detective are black and
white. The 15 issues of the comic’s arc hang together on
the noir comic aesthetic that they share: stark images
paired with sparse, strange, and driving text. These
detective genre conventions signal readers to expect
the kind of confusion and then slow progress toward
clarity that are distinctive of detective stories, but the
Generated Detective turns that promise of emerging
order upside down. Here, words and images are bor-
rowed from pre-existing works. The Generated
Detective is, according to its subtitle, ‘‘An
Algorithmic Comic’’ the way it was assembled both
works within and subverts genre conventions.
Readers will not ﬁnd a coherent plotline in the comic,
much less a description of a mystery being solved.
Instead of reading about a detective working to make
sense of crime and reveal its perpetrators, here the
reader becomes a detective with limited options. As
they struggle to connect text to image, one page to the
next, and to make sense of the comic’s senselessness,
readers themselves become detectives. The question of
authorship that powers detective ﬁction—authorship
and, of course, accountability—becomes a pursuit for
the reader not within the pages, but about them.
It is much easier to make sense of how the Generated
Detective was made than it is to discern a coherent plot
thread within it. On the GitHub page for the project,
Greg Borenstein describes the evolution of the software
he used to produce the comic. The initial script searches
a collection of detective novels legally designated to no
longer be owned by their author, and instead, for all they
might be attributable to one person or another, held in
the public domain and available through Project
Gutenberg.2 The script returns sentences that match a
given keyword from this database. Borenstein then
chooses some of these sentences, searches image and
video hosting site Flickr,3 using the sentence as a
search query to ﬁnd a matching photo. A Processing4
script gives the image the black and white comic book
panel look. In later versions, he also searches sci-ﬁ
novels, modiﬁes the placement of text boxes and image
layout, experiments with using the same keyword for all
panels, gathers sentences from genres instead of by
matching keyword, and automates the selection of sen-
tences from books and images (see GitHub, 2014).
The paragraph above describes a person called
Borenstein authoring an algorithm that produces the
Generated Detective. This we understand readily from
the evidence in the comic itself, from how the comic
circulates, and from conversations on GitHub discus-
sion boards. The algorithm orders words and images,
choosing among them as it works through its script.
The authorship of the resulting comic, however, is not
as easily understood, as it is distributed between
Borenstein, the algorithm, and all the intermediate
steps that make this production possible in a process
that Ekbia and Nardi term heteromation rather than
automation (2017). To human, automatic processes,
and intermediate steps, then, we might attribute the
position of writer and artist. Further authorship
might be allocated to those who produced the words
and images that Borenstein and his algorithm make use
of. On GitHub, Borenstein celebrates the ambiguity of
his role. He writes that maintaining some core authority
allows him to make a comic that he ﬁnds interesting.
He also celebrates the ‘‘accidents’’ and ‘‘ﬂukes’’ of
automation more than the successes of his own inten-
tional interventions (GitHub, 2014).
If our interest in authorship were simply about
determining how the comic had been brought into the
world, we could conclude here. The technical proce-
dures have been revealed, who and what did it is now
understandable. However, we are interested in who we
could consider to be formally and legally accountable
for its eﬀects. To replicate some of the comic’s images,
for example, we needed to consider the comic in the
context of the system of copyright law. We also
needed to establish who, in a legal sense, owned the
panels of the comic featuring images and texts
assembled from books, algorithmically processed and
presented together.
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We could, at this point, have continued our detective
work to trace the texts’ original authors. If some trans-
parency was helpful, then why not try to reveal more?
Legal norms prevented it. The texts’ authors fell outside
the scope of our inquiry. What they made is in the
public domain through Project Gutenberg. Whoever
penned them, inherited them, or bought them has no
legal responsibility for them when it comes to issues of
distribution and reproduction. A trail which might
have, for example, taken us through a simple text
search to Joseph Smith Fletcher’s 1922 book The
Middle of Things, or to publisher Alfred A. Knopf (as
the text in both Figures 1 and 2 did), had to be aban-
doned. For our interest in copyright, it was a red
herring.
The original images for the comic on Flickr pre-
sented us with a diﬀerent kind of trouble, but we
reached a similar conclusion. The processed versions
with added text above were only available on the
Generated Detective webpage, and the originals were
drawn from a selection legally available for repurposing
and signiﬁcantly altered afterwards. While it may have
been possible to trace them back to their sources,
whether by reverse image lookup, or by consulting
Borenstein, the search would not yield a solely respon-
sible author.
Conscious of the form of accountability that mat-
tered within copyright law pertinent to Big Data &
Society and Sage Publishing, we disregarded extraneous
leads and abandoned eﬀorts to interrogate Flickr,
Fletcher’s writing, Processing scripts and even musings
on the production of the comic at GitHub. Many
authorship functions collapsed into the one we had
use for: Greg Borenstein himself. After a short email
exchange, he granted his permission for us to replicate
the images in this paper. The replication issue was
resolved. We had our accountable-enough author.
An unsatisfying resolution
As we conducted this exercise, the relationship between
transparency and accountability acquired new dimension.
It was surprisingly easy for us to connect with Borenstein,
to secure his authorization to use the frames in the story,
and to project our relationship with him into the future
by promising to give him a copy of our commentary.
Tracing relations to the authors of the words and
images drawn into Borenstein’s story was a totally diﬀer-
ent matter. Those leads were dropped. Largely, we set
these clues aside because there was a shared system of
accountabilities—the copyright law pertinent to this
publication—that spared us that work. Regardless of
our inability to trace speciﬁc answers to questions like
‘‘who did it?’’ and ‘‘who is responsible?’’ beyond
Borenstein, the legal system precluded the need to
doing so. Little is at stake in our reproduction of the
frames from the Generated Detective, and it may seem
inappropriate to draw conclusions about algorithmic
forms based on this simple and playful case. In our
reading, however, the implications of our interactions
Figure 1. A panel from the first issue of Generated Detective.
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with Borenstein are telling; Borenstein’s willingness to
become accountable and the copyright law system that
allows him to do so, are both essential. Regardless of
how distributed the authorship of the pieces that make
up the story ultimately is, Borenstein has access to a
larger-scale framework that allows him to step up to
own Generated Detective.
We do not seek to propose a method for
distributing accountability here; only to demonstrate
how the transparency we achieved through detection is
bound by legal accountability. Our broader point is that
algorithmic accountability is complicated not because an
algorithm is complicated, but because making an actor/
authoraccountable is a complex issue that arranges large-
scale agencies, social relations and histories in diverse
ways depending on what is at stake. To build the chain
ofpotential authorship,weneeded tounderstandhowthe
Generated Detective puts the pieces together, that is, to
have a functioning understanding of how the algorithm
does its work. However, at each step, our detective work
demonstrated the entanglementof algorithmicworkwith
other processes and agents. Revealing the algorithm and
who stepped up as its author in ways that were suﬃcient
for reproduction permissions did not resolve a mystery,
in the detective story sense, but it did resolve our
immediate problem. We secured an author and an
authorization. In narrow regulatory terms, we had
made somebody accountable for the story; in broader
understandings of algorithms as social processes, we
did not even begin to scratch the surface. Our work, like
the comic itself, entailed no satisfying revelation.
This is the conundrum of accountability, particularly
in the case of algorithms. Nothing intrinsic to the algo-
rithm itself makes it easy or hard to decipher who is
accountable for its consequences. Fully tracing the
leads we had available became unnecessary when
Borenstein was willing to claim authorship, grant
authorization for reproduction, and continue the conver-
sation. Even the small amount we were able to uncover
with respect to the comic’s complex authorship was well in
excess of our legal needs. It was a simple enough process,
though under diﬀerent circumstances—a diﬀerent algo-
rithm with diﬀerent ﬁnancial consequences—the story
would most likely have been radically diﬀerent. This
conundrum reﬂects broader political and historical
decisions to protect, expose, or identify certain authors,
and not others, in relation to diﬀuse values such as
subjectivity, justice, responsibility, ethics, and capitalist
accumulation.
Our playful case is an opportunity to reﬂect on the
question of how transparency and accountability are
created with respect to technical content. Revealing
an author is not always the means to achieve account-
ability; having somebody step up to claim authorship is
enough. In other words, we want to draw attention
to how in the search for algorithmic accountability
there has sometimes been a slippage between the ‘‘com-
plication’’ of the algorithm as technical mystery with
diﬀuse authors and the broader legal, ethical and insti-
tutional structures within which it exists and which
determine who can be made accountable. It is not
necessarily due to the technical machineries and
Figure 2. A panel from the second issue of Generated Detective.
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complicated chains of algorithmic forms working in
connection with each other that accountability is diﬃ-
cult. Rather, it is diﬃcult because it is hard to hold
institutions and individuals accountable for the eﬀects
of their actions using legal norms that make protect
parties that we would want to make responsible for
the consequences of algorithms, regardless of whether
they are the authors or not. Those protections are
embedded in broad social and institutional structures.
Accountability is subject to convention. Who or
what can be understood to responsible, and the conse-
quences of their responsibility, are determined in rela-
tion to already established legal and ethical principles.
The bureaucratic institutional form, the notion of pri-
vate property, the idea of corporate personhood, and
the legal bounds of juridical causality can inform our
detective work but keep consequences beyond the reach
of the accountability detective. An algorithm is never
just a technical process. It requires integration into a
broader sociotechnical system to work (see, for exam-
ple, Eubanks, 2018; Noble, 2018; Schu¨ll, 2012) and
eﬀective accountability measures must acknowledge
that entanglement.
Put another way: the problem with a Facebook ad-
targeting algorithm that facilitates the circulation of mis-
information (Nadler et al., 2018; Vaidhyanathan, 2018)
is not only that it cannot be deciphered, or even that the
people who designed it cannot be revealed to the public.
The problem with the way that Amazon Mechanical
Turk integrates work management algorithms with the
labour of low-status and easily exploited workers (Irani,
2015) is not only that the interfaces between automated
and human processes are obscured.
We agree with the response that Sandvig et al.
arrived at when they asked themselves: ‘‘‘Is it useful
to ask if ‘‘an algorithm’’ is unethical?’ and ‘Is ‘‘the
algorithm’’ a useful focus of legal or ethical scrutiny?’’’
(2015: 4). It is absolutely essential to ask these ques-
tions. However, while understandings of authorship
and accountability may predispose us to evaluate an
algorithm’s ethical eﬀects and look for a culprit, the
broader structures of corporate law protect Facebook
and Amazon and the people within them from being
eﬀectively accountable for the consequences of the ways
they shape social life. Embedded as they are in context
and convention, there is little accountability to be
demanded from the legal author, the Facebook or
Amazon corporation, and virtually none from the
coders who imagined those ﬁlters or processes. What
would happen if we did not try to make somebody
responsible for the eﬀects of an algorithm by tracking
who is its author; if we considered the real complexities
of accountability in and through both? What we argue
is that, instead, we could focus on how allocating
responsibility is a matter of convention, that is,
a matter determined by a broader set of legal, ethical
and political principles, a technolegal metaphysics
(Ballestero, 2015), that may have an algorithmic body
but embodies much more than code.
As detectives, we have uncovered something of a
chain of authorship for the Generated Detective that
is adequate to our immediate needs. We have followed
clues, uncovered some leads and abandoned others. In
the process we have revealed the degree to which cer-
tain mysteries around algorithms may be, simply, easy
to solve, and that is the trouble we expose here. The
conventions of detective ﬁction promise that tracing
clues to uncover the workings of an algorithm will
help us allocate responsibility and make remedies pos-
sible, but our investigations must also consider norms
of accountability itself. That is, instead of solely pursu-
ing the question of who did it, we may reach more
productive resolutions by interrogating the structures
in which accountability is embedded. Taking algorith-
mic accountability seriously must mean considering the
legal and social norms that structure its conditions of
possibility. In our critiques and intervention, we need to
remember what the darkest detective ﬁction reveals:
ﬁnding out who did it, where, and with what instrument
matters, but the answer does not bring the culprit to
justice on its own.
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